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On December 5, 1995, the French government announced its decision to increase
its level of participation in NATO. Although France was not rejoining the Alliance's
integrated military structure, the French Foreign Minister would resume attending
meetings of NATO's Military Committee in an official capacity. This decision broke
with 30 years of French foreign policy begun by President Charles de Gaulle when he
withdrew French forces from NATO in 1966.
Why has Paris changed its NATO policy9 Officially, the French government
stated that it wanted to take an active role in reforming the Alliance after the end of the
Cold War and to strengthen the European contribution to North Atlantic security.
However, while these were actual French foreign policy goals, achieving them was not
the primary reason that France changed its NATO policy. Several events, including the
Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict had revealed the weakness of the French military
and its inability to carry out French foreign policy objectives. At the same time, the
sluggish French economy prevented France from modernizing its forces. Faced with
these realities, France had little choice but to expand its ties to NATO in the interest of




II. ORIGINS OF FRENCH NATO POLICY 5
A. FRANCE AFTER WORLD WAR II 5
1. A Nation in Ruins 5
2. National Objectives 7
B. NATO AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC 9
1. A Means to an End 9
2. Unfulfilled Expectations 11
C. THE RETURN OF de GAULLE 15
1. Ideals of Independence and Glory 15
2. Independent Nuclear Force 18
3. Withdrawal from NATO 20
D. FRENCH-NATO RELATIONS AFTER 1966 21
III. RAPPROCHEMENT 23
A. OFFICIALLY STATED REASONS AND OBJECTIVES ... 23
B. UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE 26
1. Revelations of the Gulf War 27
2. Failures of the Western European Union . . 31
3. Threat of United States' Withdrawal ... 33
4. Economic Constraints 36
VI
1
5. Election of Jacques Chirac 38
IV. CONCLUSIONS 41
A. A NEWLY DISCOVERED PRAGMATISM 41
B. PREDICTED LEVEL OF INTEGRATION 4 5
C. POTENTIAL FRENCH INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTIONS . . 48
D. RECOMMENDED U.S. POLICY ' 5 9
E. SUMMARY 61
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 65
Vlll
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 5, 1995, the French government announced its decision to establish
closer ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This action broke with thirty
years of French foreign policy that began in 1966 when Charles de Gaulle withdrew
France from NATO's integrated military structure. Beginning with an historical
overview of French-NATO relations, this study seeks to determine why France changed
its policy.
According to official government statements, France desired to play an active role
in the process of reforming the Alliance after the end of the Cold War and to strengthen
the European contribution to North Atlantic security. However, while these were
official French policy goals, they were not the primary reasons that France adopted a
new position toward NATO. Several other events that occurred after the collapse of the
Soviet Union left France with little choice but to establish stronger foreign alliances in
the interest of its own national security.
The most influential event was the Persian Gulf War. This conflict revealed the
inefficacy of nuclear weapons, a cornerstone of France's military strategy, in the post
Cold War era. It also demonstrated the limitations of the French military due to
outdated weapons systems, a conscript force, and essentially nonexistent military'
intelligence. Despite its considerable military budget, France was unable to project
power in a distant conventional war.
IX
France's inability to influence foreign affairs was further exposed by the civil war
in Bosnia. This was an opportunity for the French to regain a mesaure of credibility as
a major power by dealing with an international incident in its own back yard. The
decision by the U.S. government to initially not get involved in the conflict provided
France with an ideal situation to assert itself as the leader of a united Europe that could
deal with its own security problems without the aid and interference of the United
States. However, France proved unable to get the European nations to agree upon a
course of action and the hostilities in Bosnia continued until the United States finally
intervened.
The poor performance of France in these two conflicts made it clear that its
foreign and military policy had to be revised. However, economic constraints
prevented France from modernizing and augmenting its forces sufficiently to maintain
de Gaulle's legacy of independence. France had little choice but to reestablish ties with
NATO. This action was not possible, though, until the final piece fell into place - the
election of Jaques Chirac. Just as only Nixon could go to China, only a Gaullist was
able to return la France to the alliance that had been rejected by the nation's savior.
The paper concludes with an assessing the extent to whichFrance will reintegrate
into the alliance's military structure, potential French contributions to NATO and how
the U.S. government should respond to this new policy. Although the contribution of
French military intelligence will very limited, its conventional forces will be a useful
asset in future low intensity conflicts such as the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia
Therefore, the U.S. should encourage closer ties between NATO and France,





On December 5, 1995, Foreign Minister Herve de Charette
announced a new French policy toward NATO. Breaking with a
30-year-old Gaullist legacy, he stated that France intended
to resume official attendance at meetings of NATO's Military
Committee. In addition, French officers would also attend
NATO's Defense College in Rome, the SHAPE Oberammergau
College, and the Situation Center, while France would work
toward improving relations with SHAPE. France's stated
objective was to take an active role in reforming the
Alliance, focusing on the development of the European
defense pillar within the new structure of NATO.
This paper examines the events which led to this
reversal of French policy toward NATO. It begins with an
historical review of the development of French NATO policy.
The review identifies the desire of France to reclaim its
position as a world power after World War II and how Paris
viewed the North Atlantic Alliance as a means to achieving
this goal. It also examines the rationale behind de
Gaulle's withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military
structure in 1966.
After tracing the historical development of French-NATO
relations, the paper then turns to the question of why
France is now seeking closer ties with NATO. Going beyond
official French claims of wanting to participate in the
process of reforming the Alliance, the paper identifies
several events that left the French government with little
choice but to take a more active role in NATO if it wanted
to participate in European security affairs. These events
include the collapse of the Soviet Union, French military
and intelligence deficiencies identified in the Gulf War,
and Europe's inability to deal with the Bosnian conflict.
These factors combined with failed French efforts to
supplant NATO with the WEU as the leading institution of
European security, shrinking defense budgets, and the
potential for decreased American participation in European
security to induce France to return to NATO in order to
achieve its own security goals.
The final section argues that France's decision to
expand its ties to NATO reflects a new sense of pragmatism
in French foreign policy. Greater national security has
become more important to Paris than maintaining an illusion
of Gaullist grandeur. Finally, the paper recommends that
the United States support the French decision. While the
French contribution to the Alliance will be minimal in some
areas such as military intelligence, the increased
participation of French military forces in NATO operations
will help achieve an American foreign policy goal - improved
burden sharing of European security.

II. ORIGINS OF FRENCH NATO POLICY
A. FRANCE AFTER WORLD WAR II
1 . A Nation in Ruins
While France emerged from World War II as one of the
victors, its status as a major power was tenuous. It held a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and
possessed the world's second largest empire. 1 Yet despite
these factors, conditions within France prevented it from
playing an active role in European and world affairs.
Politically, France was very unstable. General de
Gaulle had been elected president of the provisional
government, but he lacked support in the National Assembly.
The Communist party emerged with the largest parliamentary
bloc in the first national elections following the war, 1 a
fact that disturbed other western nations. For while the
Communists "accepted de Gaulle's leadership . . . [they]
were loyal above all to Moscow." 3 The communists opposed de
Gaulle's attempt to institute a new constitution built
^ohn W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89 (London, New York,




around a strong president. They preferred a "weak
Presidency and a strong one-chamber parliament, able to push
through radical reforms." 4 Unable to overcome this
resistance, de Gaulle resigned in January 1946, leaving
France's six major political parties to deal with
intractable postwar problems. This resulted in a series of
short-lived coalition governments too weak to deal with
those situations, the most difficult of which were the
rebellions in France's overseas colonies. Indeed, the
crisis in French civil-military relations caused by the
Algerian War led to the Fourth Republic's ultimate demise.
Together with ministerial instability, France faced
tremendous economic and social challenges. The physical
ravages of the war had devastated the nation's economy -
industry produced at one third of prewar levels, less than
half of the rail system was functional and foreign trade was
virtually nil. 5 Even greater damage, however, had been done
to the nation's pride. The humiliation Nazi invasion and
the collaboration of the Vichy government had severely
tarnished France's international reputation and sense of
pride.
4 Ibid., 81.
5 Ibid. r 80.
2 . National Objectives
French leaders of the Fourth Republic set out to
reclaim France's lost international status with a three-
pronged strategy. First, they sought to increase France's
position by serving as an intermediary between the Soviet
Union and the Western Allies. The French - saw themselves as
a "moderating element indispensable to the equilibrium
between the great blocs that [were] trying to divide the
world between them." 6
Growing Cold War tensions, however, made it
increasingly difficult for France to continue this policy.
Eventually, France opted for the western camp when, during
the 1947 Moscow Conference, "French demands to separate the
Saar from Germany were rejected by the Soviets but tolerated
by the United States and Britain." 7 France further
distanced France from the East when Prime Minister Paul
Ramadier expelled the Communist Party from his coalition
government on 5 May 1947. r A new strategy of gaining
6Wynfred Joshua, French Attitudes Toward NATO (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University Microfilms, Inc., 1983), 13.
^Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic
Security (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 13,
This was a tactical move on the part of the United States and Great
Britain. France had tried to annex the same region in 1919, but was
rebuffed by the Allies who stated they had not fought Germany so that
French power could grow immeasurably. In 1947, the Soviet threat far
outweighed any similar concerns for the Allies.
e Ibid., 13.
"equality with Britain as a privileged ally of the United
States" q replaced that of playing intermediary between East
and West as a means to achieve the first element of French
strategy.
The second element of France's postwar strategy was to
ensure French domination of Germany, both militarily and
politically. 10 French sentiments were that Germany "does
not have an army and must not have one. She has no arms and
she shall have none." 11 Besides fearing another war should
Germany rearm, France desired to keep Germany dependent to
assure its own political and economic supremacy in Europe.
The final pillar of France's strategy for restored
grandeur centered on maintaining control of its colonies.
They were allegedly important for several reasons. First,
France viewed its colonies as a key element of it its
economic recovery, claiming they provided raw materials and
markets for French industries. More importantly, though,
France believed that the colonies enhanced its image as a
world power by, in effect, expanding French borders beyond




sections of the military, argued that maintaining their
presence in the colonies was their duty. They were
obligated, they said, to complete the "moral civilizing
mission that enveloped a humanitarian mystique around French
imperialism." 12 The Cold War enabled France to justify
these imperialist aims under the guise of anti-communism.
B. NATO AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
1 . A Means to an End
While France struggled to resurrect itself, the western
allies were trying to deal with the growing communist
threat. Their primary concern was not the possibility of a
Soviet invasion, but the procommunist movements that were
gaining strength within the politically unstable nations of
Europe. Rather than having a communist government come into
power, the United States sought to help these nations
recover from the war with a combination of economic aid and
security guarantees. Reluctant to become entangled in
European affairs, the U.S. favored financial assistance,
believing that the appeal of communism would fade as
national economies improved.
^Harrison, 14-15.
Money alone, however, was not enough. Some form of
security guarantee was needed to provide Europe with a sense
of safety while the recovery process took hold. Thus, in
1949 the United States cast off its isolationist mantle and
signed the North Atlantic Treaty, linking itself militarily
with Canada and ten European nations. As tensions with the
Soviet Union grew, this treaty became the foundation of
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
A European-American alliance to 'oppose the Soviet
threat fit well with French foreign policy objectives. In
addition to providing protection, France saw the Alliance as
a means to achieve its own nationalistic goals. The French
expected to "receive acknowledged first rank within the
Alliance . . . [gaining] primary responsibility for the
global management of Western security interests." 13 In this
manner, France would regain the international status it
sought. Furthermore, the Alliance would enable France to
"retain continental supremacy over the Germans and muster




2 . Unfulfilled Expectations
The Atlantic Alliance did not develop according to
French desires, however. Internal instability stemming from
political infighting prevented the French government from
playing a significant role in forming NATO. While other
western nations were discussing how to deal with the Soviet
blockade of Berlin, four separate coalition governments
dissolved and reformed within the National Assembly. 1 ' This
political instability prevented France from developing a
coherent foreign policy and taking a leading role within the
Alliance
.
The French were also unable to exploit NATO as a means
to keep Germany dependent. Their desire to prevent German
rearmament was undermined by growing cooperation in German-
American relations. This was further complicated by NATO's
military strategy. Fearing an invasion from the Soviet
Union, NATO planners identified the need for increased
conventional forces. Without greater conventional
capabilities, NATO would have been forced to use nuclear
weapons to counter such an invasion. The only possible
source for the additional ground troops needed by NATO was
West Germany. France strongly opposed this action, yet
15Young, 87.
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despite all its efforts, "Paris could not scuttle this most
disagreeable enterprise . " 1(J Eventually, "German rearmament
became the explicit condition of an expanded American
commitment in Europe." 17
The only area in which French policy aims benefitted
from NATO membership was in its colonial struggles. France
received extensive military aid from the United States in
support of the war in Indochina. Although the U.S. financed
much of the Indochina war, American foreign policy goals
conflicted with those of France, which eventually strained
Franco-American relations further.
French colonial possessions were a mixed blessing at
best. While some in France argued that the empire provided
credibility to French claims of world power status, that
status increasingly came at a huge price. In 1950, the war
in Indochina was consuming 40 to 45 percent of the nation's
defense budgets. 18 Much of this funding was aid from the
United States. "By early 1953, the United States was paying






Divergent objectives accompanied American aid, however.
Where the French wished to maintain Indochina as a colony,
the United States wanted to strengthen an independent
Vietnam, free from French control as well as Communism.''
This conflict of interests came to a head when Washington
refused to intervene militarily to rescue French forces at
Dien-Bien-Phu. That defeat precipitated a French withdrawal
from Indochina and led France to question the value of
American security guarantees for the first time.
That belief was reinforced by the lack of Alliance
support for French control of Algeria. 21 France argued that
it was combating a guerre revolutionnaire in North Africa,
defending NATO interests against Arab nationalism, a
movement allegedly supported by international communism. It
claimed that the Algerian rebellion was one manifestation of
an overall "cryptocommunist enemy assisting in the effort to
undermine the West's strategic position on the
Mediterranean."-- According to the French, they were
actually doing the Alliance's dirty work. "Rather than
2CIbid., 39.
;:Unlike its other overseas holdings, France considered Algeria to
be a part of the French metropole, not a colony. It was specifically
identified as a region under the protection of NATO in Article 6 of the




luxuriating on the placid German front, France was spilling
her blood in the more costly and less glamourous adventure
in Algeria." 23
The United States rejected this view, however, fearing
that French action in northern Africa would drive
nationalist Arabs into closer ties with the Communists.
U.S. opposition to French military operations, 'first in the
Suez Canal crisis in 1956, and then in Tunisia two years
later, strained relations between the two countries and
caused Paris to question the U.S. commitment to European
security. 24
The North Africa conflict also produced problems within
France. The Algeria question so divided the nation that in
1958 it was on the verge of civil war. In the midst of this
crisis, Charles de Gaulle returned as the only man who could
reestablish coherence to French foreign and colonial policy.
To this point, the North Atlantic Alliance had proven
to be much less useful than France had hoped. The security
guarantees that the Alliance provided depended on the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, and France questioned their protection.
Ibid., 41.
'"''During the Suez crisis, the Soviet Union threatened to attack
Paris and London with nuclear weapons. Rather than countering with
threats of its own against Soviet cities, the U.S. pressured France and
Great Britain to withdraw its forces from Egypt.
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After events such as the Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet
launch of Sputnik, Paris doubted the United States
government's willingness to risk American lives for those of
its European allies. ::: The Alliance was equally
disappointing as a vehicle to aid France to regain its
national pride. Rather than enhancing France's status, NATO
seemed to thwart French objectives at every turn.
Realistically, though, France had to blame its own
policies for its lack of influence within NATO. What
military strength it did have was being used in support of
French overseas interests and not the Alliance's integrated
military structure. This lack of participation prevented
France from having a greater say in NATO affairs.
C. THE RETURN OF de GAULLE
1 . Ideals of Independence and Glory
Clearly, the roots of discord between France and NATO
began long before the return of de Gaulle. However, unlike
the leaders of the Fourth Republic, he provided the strong
will necessary to unify France. He instituted a new
"The Suez crisis demonstrated the central importance of nuclear
weapons in world affairs during the Cold War. The nations with these
weapons were able to dictate the actions of those without. This was a key
event in France's decision to develop its own nuclear capability.
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constitution that formed the Fifth Republic and created a
government built around a strong president and a greatly
curtailed parliament. He then set about the task of
recapturing what one historian described as his ideal of
French "independence and grandeur":
Independence and grandeur constitute the dual
image permeating all of de Gaulle's references to
France. It is nearly impossible to separate these
two abstract and almost metaphysical concepts that
are purported to be the very essence of France's
identity and prerequisites for national self-
esteem. Independence, however, seems to be the
precondition for grandeur in that it frees France
to seek her rightful place in the world. In the
Gaullist lexicon, independence is an ideal
signifying the absence of enduring and unyielding
external restraints on France's freedom and
ability to make policy choices in the national
interest . 26
To achieve this independence, de Gaulle adopted a
posture of intransigence, claiming that weaker nations could
not afford the "luxury" of compromise. 27 This meant no
longer acquiescing to the demands of the U.S. in hope of
gaining American support for French goals. Regardless of
France's weakened condition, he demanded special treatment
because of his perception of the nation's inherent





France receive [d] the homage of the world and her status
[was] recognized and confirmed in the behavior of others." 28
De Gaulle repeatedly identified the integrated military
structure of NATO dominated by the U.S. as one of the main
impediments to French independence. He argued that it
deprived France of the right to determine its own foreign
policy. American control of both major NATO commands -
ACLANT and SHAPE - along with a U.S. general always holding
the position of SACEUR, "meant that the most basic decisions
about French security were taken without her participation
as an equal." 1 -' He felt this forced France to depend too
heavily on other nations for its defense and weakened the
French military's sense of ultimate responsibility for
national security.
In reality, while providing a convenient issue which
allowed de Gaulle to criticize the Alliance, "integration"
was more a myth than a substantial impediment to French
control of her own defense. Despite the purported
restrictions imposed by NATO, France freely deployed its
forces in support of its overseas wars. One fourth of the




instead of fulfilling its NATO commitments within Europe,
France sent 400,000 troops that had been assigned to the
alliance structure in West Germany and France to support
117,000 soldiers already fighting in North Africa. :": By
I960, France only had a "token presence in NATO" consisting
of 50,000 troops stationed in West Germany. 31
2 . Independent Nuclear Force
Never one to be deterred by the facts, de Gaulle
continued to pursue the elusive goal of independence.
Nuclear weapons played a critical role in this undertaking.
Initially, France had sought some form of control over
American weapons, though with little success. French
demands ranged from seeking "European" control of all U.S.
nuclear weapons in Europe to French participation in any
U.S. decision to use nuclear force anywhere in the world,
except in cases of self defense. 32
When these endeavors failed, France turned to




"France had secretly discussed developing nuclear weapons with
Germany during the Fourth Republic, but de Gaulle rejected this plan after
he returned to office.
18
would return to France the responsibility for its own
defense while also enhancing the nation's status as a world
power. "Such an arsenal would allow the European nations to
intervene in the new warfare with their own weapons, and
would give them the possibility of recovering a role of
first rank in the direction of the coalition." 34
France detonated its first atomic bomb on' 13 February
1960. y~ Following this event, French military strategy was
quickly refocused around nuclear forces consisting of three
types of delivery systems: Mirage IV bombers, land-based
intermediate range ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile
submarines. Development of these systems required
tremendous cuts from the conventional military. From 1962
to 1967, the French army decreased by 43 percent. 3 ' Yet
while the costs of obtaining a nuclear force were
substantial, the overall cost of a nuclear defense program
was considered cheaper and more effective in the long run
than relying solely on conventional forces.
34 Ibid., 36-37.
"Ibid., 97.
36Ibid. , 122. This force reduction was the result of both the shift
to a nuclear strategy and the end of the Algerian War.
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3. Withdrawal from NATO
In conjunction with the creation of its own nuclear
force, France gradually began to scale back its official
links to NATO. In 1963, France withdrew its Atlantic fleet
from Alliance authority. 37 Then in 1965, France refused to
participate in Fallex '66, an exercise based on the proposed
new NATO strategy of flexible response. 38 Initially, these
actions had minimal impact on French-NATO relations.
However, by 1965, as France continued to distance itself
from the Alliance, Washington began to develop "contingency
plans for defending Europe without a French contribution. .
//39
This planning proved to be providential, for in early
1966, de Gaulle announced that "he had decided to modify the
conditions governing France's participation in the Alliance.
. . .
" 40 According to the new conditions, all French forces
would no longer be available to NATO as of 01 July, 1966.
The Alliance headquarters and all associated organizations,
"Ibid., 138.
38Ibid., 139. The "Flexible Response" strategy, already adopted by
the U.S., was based on the concept of employing the least force required
to deter Soviet aggression instead of immediate nuclear retaliation. It
placed more emphasis on conventional forces just a France was investing




along with the foreign forces stationed in France were to be
removed by 01 April, 1967. 41 Despite mixed reactions from
the other allies, these target dates were met, and France
was finally free from NATO's integrated military structure.
D. FRENCH-NATO RELATIONS AFTER 1966
Ironically, de Gaulle's partial withdrawal achieved the
special status France had sought within the Alliance all
along. Though no longer militarily integrated, France
remained a member of NATO with representatives still
participating in meetings of the North Atlantic Council and
unofficially attending meetings of the Military Committee as
"observers." And in reality, de Gaulle's strategy entailed
very little risk for French security. The nation continued
to benefit from the protection that the United States
provided to the rest of NATO Europe without having to comply
with any military force structure requirements.
The principles established by de Gaulle continued to
shape French foreign policy long after his death in 1970.
In 1972, these principles were summarized in an official
government statement - The White Paper on National Defense.
"It was based on all the notions of national primacy, esprit
41 Ibid., 145.
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de defense, French exceptionalism, and the 'exclusive
national' character that de Gaulle had taught." 42 This
document served as the foundation of French defense policy
throughout the remainder of the Cold War. The governments
of Georges Pompidou, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Frangois
Mitterrand all maintained the separation from NATO's
military structure that had been so critical to de Gaulle's
view of French independence.
42Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France , (Princeton, New
Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1993), 70.
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III. RAPPROCHEMENT
A. OFFICIALLY STATED REASONS AND OBJECTIVES
Given the strength of de Gaulle's legacy, why did
France seek closer ties to NATO at the end of 1995?
According to government statements, this decision was based
on several factors, including the end of the Cold War, the
need to reform the Alliance, and the opportunity to develop
as stronger European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
within NATO.
First of all, French officials insisted that France was
not actually "returning" to NATO, but was instead
establishing ties with the leading post-Cold War European
security institution. "The present Atlantic organization is
not the same one [France] left under General de Gaulle. " 4 -
The end of the Cold War had altered the balance of power
within Europe and eliminated the Alliance's original ralson
d'etre - collective defense against the Soviet threat.
NATO had responded to this shift in the political
climate by reorienting its focus on a number of new
43Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, "Jacques Chirac Calls for
Pragmatic European Defense Concept," Le Monde , 01 Feb, 1996, p. 3, FBIS,
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missions. These new tasks included conducting peace keeping
operations in support of the United Nations or the OSCE,
such as the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia that was
being formed at that time. The participation of French
forces in IFOR and future operations necessitated that
French military leaders take part in NATO strategy and
planning meetings. In the words of one French official, "It
would be unthinkable for our soldiers to be engaged in the
field under allied command at "a time when our minister of
defense and our chief of the general staff would not
participate in the decision making process within these
Alliance bodies." 44
Together with the desire to play a greater role in
planning military operations, France also expressed its
interest in being more actively involved in NATO's overall
reform. In order to perform its new missions, Paris claims
that the Alliance's military structure need to be changed.
The existing chain of command, designed to conduct a total
war, is considered "too heavy and rigid to respond with
sufficient flexibility to the new, limited types of military
44 Pierre Lellouche, interviewed in "Why France has Reintegrated
NATO," Jean-Gabriel Fredet, Le Nouvel Observateur , 3 Jan 96, pp. 30-31,
FBIS.
24
operations . . .
"
4
- that NATO is undertaking. "Non-Article
5" missions such as peace keeping or humanitarian relief do
not require the heavy command structure that still exists. 46
Finally, in conjunction with reforming NATO, France
stated that it was taking a more active role in order to
establish a stronger European pillar within the Alliance.
In his announcement, Foreign Minister de Charette said that
"President Jacques Chirac made the decision to reinforce a
'European identity 1 within NATO and help adapt the alliance
to post-Cold War realities." 47
In particular, France is interested in developing the
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept established in 1994
as the model for NATO reform. This new model provides for
the use of NATO assets in operations in which all the
Alliance nations do not participate. This specifically
pertains to missions that the United States does not join.
France has asserted that "command and staffing for a non-
Article 5 military operation must largely be a function of
the countries that [participate] in the operation rather
"'Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival ,
Spring 1996, vol. 38, no. 1, p. 67.
"Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the original
military missions of the Alliance which do not include conducting search
and rescue or providing humanitarian aid.
"'"Reversing De Gaulle, France Draws Closer to NATO," Associated
Press, 5 Dec, 1995, Internet Nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world.
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than of a pre-set, integrated command arrangement." 48 In
those instances when the U.S. does not commit forces, the
CJTF concept allows the nations involved to utilize NATO
assets and take command of the operation. France views this
as a tremendous opportunity for Europe to strengthen its own
defense identity by being able to operate without U.S.
oversight
.
B. UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE
These officially stated reasons for France's new policy
toward NATO, however, do not fully explain France's changed
policy. The end of the Cold War actually did little to
improve French relations with NATO. Philip Gordon described
the period from November 1989 to February 1991 as a missed
"window of opportunity during which France might have
greatly reduced its opposition to NATO integration and
sought better military relations with the United States." 49
If anything, the reduced tensions between the East and the
West led France to redouble its opposition to NATO's
integrated military structure, contending that the
diminished Soviet threat rendered it obsolete. "We are no
48Grant, 67.
49Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France , (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 165.
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longer in the perspective of the third world war, where we
had to prepare for a massive response to a relatively
clearly identified massive attack. ... A permanent
integrated structure could only be justified in this
perspective." 51 So while the end of the Cold War set the
stage for a shift in France's NATO policy, it did not ensure
that shift would be toward improved relations. It took the
combined impact of several other events that followed the
thawing of tensions between the east and the west to bring
France back to the alliance.
1 . Revelations of the Gulf War
The first event that led France to begin reevaluating
its attitude toward NATO was the Gulf War of 1990-91. This
conflict revealed severe weaknesses in the capabilities of
the French military. First, conscription greatly restricted
the number of French forces that could be assigned to the
coalition. Because President Mitterrand remained faithful
to a long tradition which reserved French conscripts for
territorial defense, only 12,000 troops out of a French army




professional army of 160,000 provided 35,000 troops to the
coalition
.
The French also faced a tremendous logistical problem
in transporting forces to the Gulf theater. Lacking any
significant military sealift capacity, France had to employ
several hundred military and civilian aircraft flights over
a three week period to transport the small force. 52
Finally, when the French did arrive, their equipment was
largely outdated and meshed badly with more advanced U.S.
systems. Carrier-based Crusaders were deemed "inadequate
for modern warfare," while Jaguars lacked the avionics
necessary for night and all-weather operations. 51 Lack of
technical capabilities limited the overall impact of these
air forces. The French air force flew 1.2 percent of all
allied sorties while the Daguet Division of light tanks had
to be augmented by American artillery to be able to perform
its mission of providing cover to the western flank of
coalition forces. " [A] s with French air forces, French
ground forces were assigned the only tasks they were deemed
capable of accomplishing." 54
52 Ibid., 180.
"Ibid.
54David S. Yost, "France and the Gulf War of 1990-1991: Political-
Military Lessons Learned," The Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 16, No.
3, (September 1993): 345-346.
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Perhaps even more telling, though, were the weaknesses
revealed by the Gulf War in French military intelligence.
Prior to the invasion, this weakness had been demonstrated
when President Mitterrand received a briefing from the
United States complete with satellite photos that revealed
the Iraqi troop build up along the Kuwaiti border. However,
when he asked to keep the photos for further analysis, his
request was denied. 5 ' Throughout the Gulf conflict, France
continued to depend heavily on the United States for such
information. Defense Minister Pierre Joxe said after the
war ended, "Without Allied intelligence support, we were
almost blind." 56
French forces in theater also lacked effective combat
intelligence support. "[N]o combat intelligence arm
[existed] in the French forces. . . . The French were so
limited in staff personnel to deal with intelligence that
they would have been utterly lost had the Americans not
supplied them." 57 This weakness "exposed in all its
55 Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services , (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1995) , 492.
56 Ibid. , 493,
c
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nakedness the absurdity of France's ambitions to play the
role of a great power." 58
The fact that France had nuclear weapons could not
compensate for outmoded conventional forces rendered even
less effective by almost nonexistent military intelligence
support. Without the means to keep track of developing
world events, the French government could not effectively
deploy its forces. Once in the field, the French military
command also demonstrated the impact of insufficient
intelligence support, being unable to participate in the
coalition effort against Iraq without U.S. assistance. For
France, the Gulf War demonstrated that trying to maintain
its independence with a foreign policy based on incomplete
intelligence was a very dangerous game to play.
Confronted with this reality, France began to recognize
the need to revamp its military structure and instituted a
vast overhaul of the entire system. This reform consisted
of five main elements, including better crisis prediction
and management, greater joint operational capabilities, and
increased power projection. 59 These changes represented
some of the most extensive reforms in the French military
58 Ibid. , 491.
"Pierre Joxe, "The Future of the French Armed Forces," Le Figaro ,
19 May, 1992) .
30
since France began the development of nuclear forces. They
did not, however, alter French relations with NATO.
2 . Failures of the Western European Union
Instead of turning to NATO, France looked to another
organization as a means to compensate for its own military
weaknesses. This organization was the Western European
Union. Formed before NATO, the WEU had been an early
attempt at European collective defense. Once the North
Atlantic Treaty had been signed, though, the WEU faded into
irrelevancy.
As the Cold War ended, France sought to expand the role
of the WEU which had been revived in 1984. The Gulf War had
shown the weakness of France's conventional military.
Lacking the economic means to overcome this weakness on its
own, France tried to find strength in numbers while still
remaining free of American dominance. It proposed a plan to
develop the WEU into a purely European defense organization
with direct ties to the European Union. According to this
plan, the WEU would eventually merge with the EU to become
the military wing of this political and economic body.
Eventually, France hoped that the WEU would replace NATO as
the leading European security institution.
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The French proposal received mixed reviews. Germany
supported the idea of the WEU merging with the EU while
Great Britain insisted that they remain separate. Many of
the smaller nations in NATO, including the Netherlands and
Portugal, balked at the idea of tampering with the status
quo of having NATO at the head of European security. Their
opposition was twofold. Economically, it made no sense to
spend money on an organization that would at best duplicate
the functions NATO already performed. At a more basic
level, though, the smaller nations of Europe preferred "to
entrust their security to the distant, powerful, and more
disinterested United States ..." than to an organization
dominated by France and Germany. 60
France's efforts to supplant NATO with the WEU began to
unravel, however, in Bosnia. The U.S. had remained
conspicuously absent from the early stages of the civil
strife in Yugoslavia, content to let Europe deal with the
problem in its own back yard. This would appear to have
been the perfect opportunity for France to unify Europe and
demonstrate the WEU ' s ability to serve as an alternative to
NATO. Instead, the western European nations proved unable
'Gordon, 173.
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to agree on a policy or a course of action to control this
latest conflict in the Balkans.
The civil war in Bosnia continued until the United
States finally took action, first with the Dayton peace
talks, and then as the defacto leader of NATO's IFOR. Once
again, France's desire to play the role of a world leader
exceeded its ability to convince other nations to follow.
At the same time, NATO demonstrated its continued usefulness
and ability to adapt to the new threats to European
security. The Bosnian crisis "ended French dreams of
building a separate 'European defense identity' and
promoting the Western European Union as a rival to NATO." 61
3 . Threat of United States ' Withdrawal
The Bosnian experience affected French opinion about
NATO in two ways. In addition to showing the Alliance's
continued relevance, it also made France aware of the
dangers of not having the United States actively involved in
Europe
.
Such a situation appeared to be increasingly possible.
Domestic pressures for a peace dividend within the U.S. had
produced large cuts in the American armed forces. These
61J.A.C. Lewis, "France May Have Hidden Agenda in Retaking Seat at
NATO Table," Jane's Defence Weekly , Jan 17, 1996, p. 17.
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included the reduction from more than 300,000 troops
stationed in Europe to about 100,000. Some members of
Congress were even suggesting a complete withdrawal.
Perhaps surprisingly, such sentiments did not fulfill
the ideal French vision for Europe. While France resented
what it considered U.S. dominance of NATO, it did not want
the U.S. presence eliminated. Indeed, "French leaders from
across the political spectrum have come out clearly for an
American presence on the continent. . . . " 62
There were several reasons for France to want the U.S.
to remain engaged in Europe. First, the end of the Cold War
did not mean the end of threats to European security.
Rising ethnic and religious tensions throughout Eastern
European and northern Africa were creating an environment
filled with dangers of its own. While the U.S. presence in
NATO may have proved onerous at times, it nonetheless gave
Europeans a sense of security.
In order to be able to face the new challenges of the
post-Cold War era, France desired to gain access to American
assets through NATO. Prior to the announcement of its new
policy toward the Alliance, France had expressed this desire
in the context of the WEU and CJTF. At the NATO Brussels
2Gordon, 176.
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summit in 1994, France proposed that NATO make the
"collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis
of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU
operations undertaken by the European Allies. . . . " 63 In
particular, the European nations would be unable to conduct
any extensive missions without the use of American aerial
refueling aircraft, cargo ships and planes, intelligence and
communications support. As its plans for the WEU to become
an entity separate from NATO with access to those assets
collapsed, France was forced to realize it could only
achieve this goal from within the Alliance.
Finally, France wanted to keep the United States
engaged in European affairs because of German reunification,
the "most important factor in explaining recent French
positions on European defense." 64 As mentioned before,
following World War II France had fought German rearmament.
When these efforts failed, France pursued strong bilateral
ties with its neighbor, hoping to control the relationship.
Unification upset this balance by making Germany the most
powerful nation in Europe, and potentially, therefore, its
new leader. The only western nation powerful enough to
"Jean-Marie Guehenno, "France and the WEU," NATO Review , Oct 1994,
No. 5, Vol. 42, p. 11.
64Gordon, 175.
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counter Germany's new strength is the U.S. Therefore, it
has become an "avowed French goal . . . [to] ensure the
U.S. presence in Germany and German presence in NATO." 65
In each of these situations, French opposition to what
it perceived as American dominance of European security
affairs was overcome by a growing realization of the
benefits that resulted from the U.S. presence. Ironically,
the best means to ensure continued U.S. presence has been to
support NATO.
4 . Economic Constraints
Where the other factors already discussed demonstrated
the need to change its defense policy, it was the weakness
of France's economy that prevented Paris from maintaining
its independence while making these reforms. From 1991
through 1996, the French economy averaged just over one
percent annual growth. During that same period,
unemployment rose from 9.4 to 12.7 percent. 66 The French
government is under strong pressure to improve growth and
reduce deficit spending, primarily in order to meet the
"Gordon, 168.
66Roger Cohen, "For France, Sagging Self-image and Esprit," The New
York Times , 11 Feb, 1997, p. A-6.
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requirements for European currency integration set by the
Maastrict Treaty.
Under such constraints, France cannot afford to
increase defense spending. In fact, it cannot even maintain
its forces at post-Cold War levels. The most dramatic step
taken to reduce military costs has been President Chirac's
decision to end conscription. Conscripts had been a part of
the French military since 1789, but they have become a
liability, limiting France's ability to conduct military
operations overseas. Chirac's proposal called for an all
professional force of 350,000 troops, a reduction from more
than 600,000. A study of the plan "estimated that the
withdrawal of military conscription could save the country
as much as 14 billion francs (2.8 billion dollars)." 67
Chirac has also proposed privatizing much of the French
defense industry and has taken steps to eliminate land based
nuclear missiles.
In the light of such cuts in defense spending, it would
have been impossible for France realistically to play the
role of an independent world power. France has little
choice but to seek an alliance with other nations to share
these costs. The available options were limited, and the
67
"Chirac Announces End to Compulsory Conscription in France,
Deutsche Presse-Aqentur , 28 May, 1996, LEXIS-NEXIS.
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WEU's failure to gain greater prominence left NATO as the
only game in town.
5 . Election of Jacques Chirac
While all these factors set the stage for French-NATO
rapprochement, the final piece to the puzzle that made the
new policy possible was the election of President Jacques
Chirac. Just as only Nixon was able to go to China, it took
"a neo-Gaullist ... to convince the French that their
security, and indeed that of Europe, [depended] on the
Atlantic alliance." 68
None of the administrations that followed de Gaulle
before Chirac had departed from the Gaullist vision of
French security. Early in his term, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing attempted some changes, trying to improve France's
conventional capabilities. He argued that the threat of
nuclear retaliation could not be invoked in response to
every conflict that might arise. Instead, French forces
should prepare to support France's allies to prevent a
conventional conflict from escalating and spreading to
France itself. His plans, however, resulted in heavy
opposition. Closer cooperation with "allied forces seemed
to suggest a willingness to bring France back into NATOS
'Burying the General," The Economist , 20 April, 1996, p. 39,
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[sic] integrated commands and to make peacetime commitments
to allies.""' Faced with this opposition, Giscard's
administration "was forced to retreat and to downplay the
significance of the proposed changes."''
Even the socialist Frangois Mitterrand, who had
strongly opposed Gaullist defense policies in the early
1970 's, embraced them as his own when he became President in
1981. His unwillingness to break with the legacy was most
clearly illustrated in 1994 with the publication of a new
White Paper, the first in 22 years. No longer constrained
by Cold War pressures, Mitterrand had the perfect
opportunity significantly to revise the French military
doctrine in the light of the lessons learned from the Gulf
War and, to a lesser extent, Bosnia. Yet while these
lessons were reflected in the White Paper, 71 it made no
substantial departures from the course set forth by General
de Gaulle.
Instead, the White Paper alluded to France's continued
separation from NATO, stating that the prime objective of
"Gordon, 96.
70Gordon, 94.
71Two of the top three priority issues for new capabilities
identified in the White Paper were improved intelligence support and
greater power projection. Both of these were key weaknesses of the French
military identified during the Gulf War. Livre Blanc sur la Defense -
1994 , English Edition, Service d' Information et de Relations Publiques des
Armees, pp. 6 6,70.
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French military doctrine was to "ensure the independence
[emphasis added] of the country and the defence of the
nation's vital interests." 72 The document acknowledged that
the Atlantic Alliance would continue to play a role in
European affairs, but made no mention of closer French-NATO
relations.
It was not until a political descendent of Charles de
Gaulle was elected that his ideals of independence, which
had become a cornerstone of the French concept of national
greatness, could be altered. And even then, the new policy
had to be qualified with the claim that France was not





A NEWLY DISCOVERED PRAGMATISM
How should France's new position regarding NATO be
interpreted? Some analysts have suggested that it is merely
an attempt to modify Gaullist strategies to fit post-Cold
War Europe. They argue that, rather than adopting a new
policy, Paris is trying to revive "de Gaulle's old idea of
forming an inner leadership within the alliance. . . .
"
This view, however, fails to recognize how significant a
shift rapprochement is in French foreign and security
policy.
Over the past thirty years, the Gaullist ideal of
independence has become a foundational pillar of the French
national identity. Therefore, returning to NATO's fold was
a major step for the French government. They perceived this
decision as sacrificing a certain degree of national
sovereignty. Certainly, the other members of NATO would not
consider this as a major sacrifice, but it is important to
view the decision from the French perspective to fully
understand its significance.
JJ.A.C. Lewis, "France May Have Hidden Agenda
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Developing closer ties to NATO was not France's first
choice for its national security policy. However, the
events described in the previous chapter left Paris with few
other options if it wished to remain engaged in European
security affairs. The fact that France was willing to give
up what it considered a measure of independence in exchange
for greater security demonstrated a new sense of pragmatism
in French foreign policy.
Historically, France has tended to base its foreign
policy decisions on preconceived notions of what it wanted
to be true rather than reality. In developing its war plans
prior to World War I, the French general staff insisted that
an offensive strategy was the key to victory. They held to
this belief despite intelligence reports that clearly showed
the German army to be far stronger than the French.
France's colonial policy after World War II ignored the
reality of decolonization that was going on throughout the
rest of the world. France wanted to believe that it could
retain control of it overseas holdings, and this belief
nearly led to a military coup.
Perhaps the greatest example of French policy based on
wishful thinking was de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's
military structure. The sense of independence this move
provided, combined with the development of the French
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nuclear arsenal, led France sincerely to view itself as a
powerful, independent actor on the Cold War stage. Once the
bipolar order of the Cold War fell apart, however, France
rudely discovered that it could no longer play that role, if
indeed it truly ever had. So long as the threat had been
well defined, France was able to focus its military strategy
and planning against the Warsaw Pact, all the while
benefiting from the protection it still received from the
United States. New threats began to spring up with the end
of the Cold War, though, and forced France to realize that
it did not have the ability to meet these challenges on its
own. In breaking with the Gaullist legacy, France let go of
its illusion of independence and conceded the benefits of a
continuing American military presence in Europe.
Looking back on French history, one could argue that
this decision fit into a common pattern from which Gaullism
was a departure. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815,
France joined with England, Russia, Prussia and Austria in a
"concert" of European nations. While not a defensive
alliance, this arrangement was nonetheless a supranational
structure to which France suborned its own desires in the
interest of greater security.
Following the concert system, France continued to enter
into other agreements. It formed an alliance with Russia in
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1894 and later an entente combined with Great Britain.
Following World War I, France strongly supported the League
of Nations. Its failure led the French to turn to seek
agreements with Belgium and Poland and then the Petite
Entente with Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia.
Unable to sustain these coalitions, France allied with
Britain to oppose Hitler. Finally, after World War II,
France joined the WEU and then NATO, the final links in a
long chain of coalitions formed to preserve its national
security.
This summary is neither all inclusive nor does it fully
describe the unique circumstances surrounding each of these
alliances. It is only meant to illustrate France's history
of forming military alliances in order to compensate for its
own defense limitations. In this light, French-NATO
rapprochement renews a familiar pattern to which the
Gaullist era was an exception. To discount France's new
NATO policy as a rehash of Gaullism misses the mark.
France's decision to build closer ties with NATO must
instead be seen as a definite break with the past thirty
years and a return to French tradition in the interest of
greater national security.
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B. PREDICTED LEVEL OF INTEGRATION
How closely will France be willing to integrate its
forces into NATO? Eventually, France should fully
reintegrate into the Alliance's conventional military
structure. It is highly unlikely, however, that the French
will participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) or any
body that could influence French nuclear policy.
Conventional force integration is necessary for France
to have any affect on NATO policy. Just as the U.S. is the
defacto leader of NATO because it contributes the largest
amount of military support, France must commit its forces to
gain any influence. "The half-hearted participation in NATO
decision making bodies typical of Mitterrand's approach was
counterproductive in terms of promoting French goals within
the alliance." 7,3 France's new pragmatic approach toward
NATO indicates that Paris has accepted the need to work
within the Alliance structure to achieve its goals.
A major step toward integration occurred at the Berlin
conference in June 1996. There the alliance adopted the
CJTF model for NATO's new military structure. This opened
the door for "the reintegration of French military units
74Grant, 65
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into NATO operations." 75 The ability to abstain from
certain operations had to ease French misgivings about
surrendering too much control of its armed forces. 76 At the
same time, the potential to take command of operations in
which the U.S. does not participate fits well with French
desires to strengthen Europe's defense identity.
However, if France intends to command a non-U. S. led
Task Force, it must reintegrate its forces. Before French
command would be accepted by other European nations, French
troops would have to be included in the operation. These
troops would have to increase their level of training with
other national forces. They would also need weapons systems
that meet NATO standards in order operate in a coalition
environment. If they do not, "France risks falling behind
in crucial new military technologies by prolonging its
estrangement from NAT0." 77A11 of these factors point
directly to the reintegration of conventional French
military forces.
75
"NATO Updated," International Herald Tribune , June 06, 1996,
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76That Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly states that
NATO members are free to determine their level of participation in any
Alliance action is something France has never seemed to grasp.
""NATO Updated."
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In contrast, it is highly unlikely that France will
take part in any NATO activities that would affect French
nuclear policy. Where the withdrawal of its conventional
forces from NATO's integrated military command structure was
a major pillar of the French ideal of independence, the
force de frappe became the cornerstone. France's nuclear
power status overshadowed the real weakness of the French
military during the Cold War. It also justified France's
otherwise weak claim to its permanent
' seat on the United
Nations' Security Council. Having its own nuclear arsenal
has become too closely linked to France's national identity
to permit other nations to influence its policy. 78
French refusal to submit its nuclear policy to NATO
oversight is not an important issue, however. Neither the
U.S. nor the Great Britain, the other nuclear nations in the
Alliance, has ever surrendered control of their nuclear
forces to NATO. The NPG develops plans to employ nuclear
weapons as part of NATO's defense strategy, but it cannot
order their use. This can only be done by the nation that
owns the weapons. Realistically, there is no difference
78Statements by the Chirac government that it would be willing to
discuss extending its nuclear umbrella over other European nations do not
conflict with this view. Those statements were made in conjunction with
the final series of French nuclear tests and were an attempt to justify
these tests in the context of overall European security. At no time did
France suggest that it was willing share control of its nuclear weapons.
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between the ultimate control the U.S. and U.K. exercise over
their nuclear forces and that so closely guarded by the
French. Thus, if France wishes to maintain the
"independence" of its nuclear weapons, the decision will
have very little effect on NATO security.
C. POTENTIAL FRENCH INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTIONS
Beyond conventional military forces, what else will
France contribute to NATO? In particular, what will be the
French intelligence contribution to the Alliance? The
French intelligence community has a long history, dating
back to the sixteenth century. Regardless of this
experience, however, the French are unlikely to provide any
intelligence support of significance. Rather than aiding
the French government, French intelligence efforts have
often proven to be ineffective, even at times
counterproductive, to the French political process:
The problem of intelligence services generally is
that, though founded to 'reduce uncertainty',
either they fail to do this or they often increase
it. In this respect, the French secrect services
have conformed to the bureaucratic norm. That
said, however, the generic problems which afflict
all intelligence services have been accentuated in
France. . . , 79
79Douglas Porch, "French Intelligence Culture: A Historical and
Political Perspective," Intelligence and Survival , July 1995, p. 489.
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France has an extensive intelligence structure.
Similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, it agencies are divided
between foreign and domestic threats. The lead foreign
intelligence service is the Direction Generale de la
Securtie Exterieure (DGSE) . Unlike its American
counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency, the DGSE is
dominated by the French military. The charter of the DGSE
charges it "to seek and exploit intelligence advantageous to
the security of France." 30 Additionally, the DGSE is
authorized to carry out actions, as directed by the
government, in support of French national security. During
the Cold War, its primary collection efforts were focused
against the Soviet Union. It also targeted terrorist
organizations and collected economic intelligence. The end
of the Cold War has brought greater emphasis to the latter
categories
.
France also has several domestic intelligence services.
Primary responsibility for countering foreign espionage
efforts and terrorist activities within France is assigned
to the Direction de la Surveilance du Territoire (DST)
.
Originally formed at the end of World War II to investigate
eoJeffery T. Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations ,
(Cambridge: Ballinger Co., 1988), 158.
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those accused of collaborating with the Vichy government,
the DST later shifted its focus to communist agents
operating in France. In recent years, more of the DST •
s
attention has been directed against the growing foreign
population living in France, particularly Muslims from
northern Africa.
French intelligence agencies also collect information
on French citizens. The Renseignements Generaux (RG)
reportedly has "a large informer network throughout France,
with informers operating in every town and village." 81 With
this network, the RG maintains files on millions of French
citizens, from members of radical political parties to
journalists and all teachers. The Renseignements Generaux
de la Prefecture de Paris (RGPP) serves as a miniature
version of the RG within the confines of Paris.
Yet despite its extensive nature, the French
intelligence community does not have a strong performance
record. The objective of any intelligence service should be
to provide quality information to the government it serves
to simplify the policy making process. Such has not been
the case for France. For a number of reasons, the French
uRichelson, 177
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government has often ignored, and at times, been embarrassed
by its secret services.
One of the main reasons that France's political and
military leaders have chosen to disregard intelligence
reports is the previously mentioned conflict between reality
and French desires. As was the case before World War I,
such reports often revealed France's weakness and its
inability to achieve its stated objectives. Rather than
accepting such information, French leaders preferred to seek
out reports that supported their plans. This led the French
intelligence services to adjust their reports to fit the
prevailing views. Another tactic was to present several
options from which government officials could choose. If
they chose poorly, the intelligence agencies could point to
a different assessment and still claim success.
The organizational structure of the French intelligence
community has further contributed to this problem. The
French government does not have a single agency that
coordinates the activities of various intelligence services
and fuses their individual reports into a unified
intelligence assessment. 82 Instead, each service operates
82The Comite Inter-ministeriel du Renseignement (CIR) was created to
serve as a liaison between the French intelligence services and other
government agencies, but it has proven to be ineffective.
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with minimal cooperation, even at times in competition.
This lack of coordination results in a fragmented
intelligence picture that produces as many questions as it
answers
.
While the French government has not effectively
incorporated its intelligence services in formulating
policy, it has employed them in other ways. France has
earned a reputation as one of the most aggressive nations in
the pursuit of economic intelligence. According to Bill
Gates, a former Director of Central Intelligence, " ^France
is among a certain number of countries who have planted
moles inside American firms, (who) steal American
businessmen's briefcases and who carry out classic spying
operations to obtain industrial and economic
information.'" 8 - France has targeted in particular new
developments in military technology. This information is
used to aid France's nationalized defense industry compete
in the international arms market. As more traditional
military threats have disappeared from the political scene,
France has placed more emphasis on such activities, viewing
economic security as a matter of national security.
83 Bill Schiller, "Spies Who Just Can't Come in From the Cold," The
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Government officials have also used domestic
intelligence agencies such as the RG and RGPP for their own
political ends. Phone taps have been used regularly to keep
track of not only foreigners suspected of subversive
actions, but also political rivals. In one recent case,
Eduard Balladour, who at the time was the French Prime
Minister and a Gaullist candidate for the French presidency,
ordered wire taps against a judge investigating the illegal
usage of campaign funds by the Gaullist Party. When this
information gained extensive attention in the French press,
Balladour justified his action as part of an effort to
"prevent what he claimed was a massive CIA conspiracy to
steal French technological and trade secrets." 84 Such
activities would not be tolerated in other western nations,
but have become accepted in France as a necessary means to
the end of preserving national security.
The French government has also employed its secret
services, often to its own regret, in conducting covert
operations. The DGSE has a long tradition of covert
operations tracing back to the French Resistance during
World War II. This has been reenforced by the natural
inclination of the military personnel in charge of the DGSE
'Douglas Porch, "French Intelligence Culture," p. 503
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to use force as a means of problem solving. "Since its
inception, the DGSE has engaged in . . . covert
operations . " 85
The term "covert operation" has been applied to actions
ranging from propaganda campaigns to assassinations. For
France, the term has become synonymous with special military
operations. During the 1950 's, an element of the DGSE known
as the Red Hand reportedly carried out several bombings
against supporters of the Algerian independence movement. 86
Other similar actions included assassination plots against
Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and attempts to foment
coups against Moamar Qaddafi.
Such activities have become a common tool for the
French government, often being used as a "substitute for an
absence of viable policy or a coherent strategy." 8 Yet
while direct action appears to offer immediate solutions to
certain problems, taking such action has tended to produce
even greater headaches for the French. In 1983, the DGSE
placed a truck bomb next to the Iranian embassy in Beirut in
response to an attack on a French military barracks that had
35Richelson, 163,
36Ibid., 164.
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killed 58 soldiers. The bomb failed to go off, however, and
was discovered. The Iranian government traced the truck
back to its origin and filed an "embarrassing protest." 8 -
Even more damaging than that failure, though, was the
successful bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1986. French
operatives sank the ship with explosives to prevent the
environmentalist group Greenpeace from protesting
underground nuclear tests on Moruroa Island. The
investigation of the bombing, which killed a member of the
ship's crew, revealed the French connection, thus
reenforcing the image of France's intelligence organizations
having more zeal than competence.
Numerous attempts have been made to reform the French
secret services. Early in his presidency, Georges Pompidou
reportedly "contemplated shutting down the SDECE
(predecessor to the DGSE) altogether and rebuilding it from
scratch." 8 - Frangois Mitterrand pledged to abolish the
agency as part of his election campaign in 1981. Though he
failed to follow through with that promise, Mitterrand did
manage to have the organization's name changed.
3B Ibid, 501.
BSPorch, The French Secret Services , p 405
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The most recent reform efforts came after the Gulf War.
In response to its complete dependence on the United States
for military intelligence during that conflict, the French
government took several steps intended to improve support to
its forces. Pierre Joxe, the French Minister of Defense,
consolidated the intelligence elements of the various
military services into a single unit named the Direction du
Renseignement Militare (DRM) . France also endeavored to
greatly improve its technical collection capabilities. In
1994 France launched the Helios I, an optical imaging
satellite intended to eliminate French dependence on the
United States for satellite reconnaissance photos.
Additional plans exist to develop other space-based
collection platforms with other European nations. 9;
Despite the rhetoric and money that the French
government has thrown at reforming its intelligence
services, though, these efforts have been largely
inconsequential. The DGSE has been able successfully to
resist the appointment of civilians to senior leadership
positions. Likewise, the military services have maintained
90After the Gulf War, French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe stated
that "France could not afford major intelligence satellite programmes
alone but Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy could join Paris in developing
satellites each nation could use for its own purposes." "French Defence
Minister Calls for European Spy Satellite," The Reuter Library Report , 06
May, 1991, BC Cycle. LEXIS-NEXIS
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their own intelligence structures despite the creation of
the DRM. Instead of improving the intelligence service to
the military, the DRM has become just another bureaucratic
layer in the already Byzantine labyrinth of the French
intelligence community. With regard to improvements in
technical collection means, new capabilities will be
meaningless without changes in the structure which they are
intended to support.
Given the historically lackluster performance of the
French intelligence services and their resistance to reform,
it is highly unlikely that France will contribute
significantly to NATO intelligence efforts. Its technical
collection assets, while improving, do not compare with
those of the United States which supplies the vast majority
of NATO intelligence. Nor does NATO need the services of
French special operations forces.
One area where France could contribute is in regard to
North Africa. France has extensive economic and political
ties with its former colonies. The French have also
maintained intelligence contacts in the region which NATO
lacks. However, in his article, "The Rise and Fall of
France's Spymasters," Percy Kemp stated that France would
not be "willing at all to co-operate with its Western
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partners/rivals in intelligence operations
. . .
" r' : in
North Africa. This assessment is accurate, provided the
area remains relatively calm. NATO has shown little
interest in becoming entangled in North African affairs.
However, were the Maghreb to become unstable due to an
Islamic revolution, NATO could become heavily involved. In
light of the massive emigration that would ensue, even if
the violence did not spread to Europe, Paris would likely
become very willing indeed to share whatever information it
had in the interest of its own security.
Short of such a direct threat, though, France will
present NATO with more challenges than benefits with regard
to intelligence. With few exceptions, the French will
provide little in the way of useful information to the
Alliance. Also, regardless of the creation of the DRM, the
French will still require support to deliver intelligence to
its forces that participate in NATO operations. Until
France is able to improve the performance of its secret
services for its own use, they will be useless to NATO.
91Percy Kemp, "The Fall and Rise of France's Spymasters,
Intelligence and Survival , January 1994, p. 17.
D. RECOMMENDED U.S. POLICY
The United States should support France's decision to
develop closer ties with NATO. Opposing the move would
accomplish nothing while reintegrating French forces into
the Alliance will help achieve the U.S. goal greater burden
sharing of European defense costs. At the same time, the
U.S. must recognize that this burden sharing will be
accompanied by changes in the upper levels of the Alliance
command structure.
There is no reason for the U.S. to oppose French moves
toward NATO. Such infighting would undermine the Alliance's
new status as the leading security institution in Europe.
Previous disagreements between the two nations should be put
aside and rapprochement encouraged. The interests of the
United States are better served by having France actively
involved in NATO.
This is particularly true in the context of post-Cold
War military downsizing. Domestic pressures and the lack of
an immediate threat have led to large cutbacks in U.S.
forces. The United States cannot play the role of the
world's policeman and must work with other nations to
maintain its security. This need for international security
cooperation has become more essential with the growth of
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American opposition to sending its forces into combat. The
antiseptic image of the Gulf War has led American citizens
to believe that wars can be won without casualties. As this
sentiment increases, politicians will find it increasingly
difficult to gain public support for involving U.S. troops
in combat operations.
Such sentiment makes France a very valuable ally. The
French have a much more utilitarian view of their armed
forces. They readily employ their military in support of
national interests and are more accepting of the ensuing
casualties. France was one of the first nations to send
troops to Bosnia as part of the United Nations Protection
Force, and later the European Rapid Reaction Force. While
participating in NATO'S IFOR in Bosnia, Paris deployed
additional forces to quell an uprising in the Central
African Republic. This willingness to make use of its
military makes France a useful ally. The opportunity to
contribute logistical support to NATO operations without
sending combat troops is likely to appeal to American
political leaders.
These same leaders must be prepared, however, to share
power within the NATO command structure. France will
rightfully expect more senior command positions in response
to its military contributions. The French have already
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requested to assume the command of Allied Forces Southern
Europe. The United States has rejected this idea, however,
as the post has been traditionally assigned to an American
admiral. A proposal that the U.S. is more likely to support
is a redefined role for the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.
Traditionally filled by a British general, under the new
plan this position would rotate among the European members
of NATO. The officer in the billet would also be the senior
WEU military officer and would assume command of non-U. S.
led CJTF's. Whether or not this will satisfy the French
remains to be seen, but it might serve as a step in the
right direction.
E. SUMMARY
Returning to the North Atlantic Alliance was not
France's preferred course of action for its security policy.
Both international and domestic events, however, left the
French government with few options. Rejecting the emphasis
de Gaulle placed on independence, France chose the more
realistic course of action in the interest of national
security. The United States should recognize the sense of
sacrifice involved in this decision and encourage further
cooperation with France. This cooperation will be needed to
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meet the new challenges and threats the North Atlantic
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